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Abstract
We show why the failure of the aliation assumption prevents the double
auction from achieving ecient outcomes when values are interdependent.
This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction.
It is shown that when there is a suciently large, but still nite, number
of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which traders continue bidding if and only if their true estimates of the
'value' of the object being traded exceed the current price. This equilibrium
is ex post ecient and has a rational expectations property in the sense that
along the equilibrium path traders appear to have made the best possible
trades conditional on information revealed by the trading process.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a dynamic ascending-price double auction mechanism in an
interdependent value environment, and shows that this mechanism supports allo-
cation that become ex post ecient as the number of traders gets large. Rustichini,
Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) have shown that in private value environments,
an equilibrium of a standard (one-shot) double auction quickly converges to an ef-
cient allocation as the number of traders get large (see also Gresik and Satterth-
waite (1989)). Recently, Perry and Reny (2002), continuing the research agenda
of Milgrom (1981) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) and (2000), have shown
that, in some interdependent value environments where trader types are aliated,
double auction supports an equilibrium price that converges in probability to the
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1full information market clearing price as the number of traders gets large. In par-
ticular, this implies that, when the number of traders is large, the double auction
realizes almost all gains from trade with a high probability and provides strategic
foundation for rational expectations equilibrium.
It is quite surprising that the static double auction (where each trader submits
only one bid or ask) supports anything close to the ecient competitive allocation,
because such mechanism imposes strong restrictions on the way in which individual
trading decisions depend on other traders' types. To see this, observe that a bid
or an ask in a double auction is, in fact, a contingent trading plan. For example,
a seller's ask is a plan that says that the seller wants to sell if the value of the
appropriate order statistic of the other traders' bids and asks is above his ask
price. This is a very restricted contingent plan since the trading decision can only
depend on the realization of the said order statistic of the bids and asks, but not
on the distribution of bids and asks below that order statistic. Furthermore, a
seller has to sell whenever the value of this order statistic exceeds his ask price.
These restrictions on the traders' contingent trading plans are very natural in the
private value case, but are very restrictive in the interdependent value case, as we
illustrate with an example below.
This motivates us to study an ascending price version of the double auction.
Our mechanism works as follows. Initially, the price is set suciently low that
all buyers would want to buy at that price and no seller would want to sell. At
this initial price, all traders simultaneously declare whether they wish to continue
bidding. All traders who wish to continue bidding are said to be active at the
initial price. Traders who declare that they do not want to continue bidding are
considered to be inactive bidders who have dropped out of the bidding at the
initial price. If the number of active bidders exceeds the number of units for sale,
the price is increased according to the procedure that will be described below, and
the process is repeated. A trader can become inactive at any price and her/his
decision to do so is publicly observable. Once the number of active traders is less
than or equal to the number of units of output for sale, the auction ends. Each
buyer who is active at the nal price pays that price and receives a unit of the
good.1 Sellers who are inactive when the auction ends trade and are paid the price
at which the auction has ended. Sellers who are active at the nal price leave the
auction without trading.
We show that this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which traders remain active only so long as their values conditional on the
information made public by the bidding process exceed the current price. Since
traders' who drop out of the bidding reveal their types in this equilibrium, other
traders can condition their bidding decisions much more nely on the distribution
1Some buyers who drop out at the nal price may also receive units of the good if too many
traders drop out of the bidding at the nal price. We discuss this in more detail below.
2of types of the others. In particular, since the bidding process reveals the types
of the traders with the lowest values, it ensures that the traders with the highest
values end up with the good even though their types are not fully revealed.
The ability to condition the decision whether to remain active on the dropout
decisions of other traders is good for eciency reasons, but bad for strategic ones.
This is why the strategies we describe constitute only an approximate perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. In particular, sellers may encounter information sets where
they can exploit the possibility that they may be pivotal without taking any sig-
nicant chance of losing a protable trade. We describe these information sets,
then provide conditions under which the expected payo associated with pushing
up the trading price becomes arbitrarily small when the number of traders is large.
Our approximate equilibrium supports an outcome which is ex post ecient
with probability 1. This allows us to address some questions that are left open in
the existing literature. For example, Perry and Reny (2002) show that the equi-
librium price in a double auction converges in probability to the full information
market clearing price. They do not directly address what happens to the equi-
librium allocation, or to the posterior beliefs (both of which are important in the
rational expectations story that they are interested in) when the number of traders
is large but nite. Furthermore, convergence in probability also leaves open the
possibility that unusual arrays of types (i.e. the ones that occur with a small prob-
ability) lead to prices that are far from full information prices. However, in the
ascending-price double auction these issues do not arise.
Also, the convergence results of Perry and Reny (2002) rely on an aliation
assumption. This assumption is common in auction theory. Nonetheless, it is a
restriction on beliefs.2 It is interesting to identify how the double auction breaks
down without aliation. It is also desirable to have a trading mechanism which
supports ex post ecient allocations with weaker restrictions on beliefs, as we
provide in this paper.
As we illustrate below by example, in the absence of aliation an indirect
mechanism can support an outcome close to a full information or a rational expec-
tations equilibrium only if traders are given an opportunity to respond to the same
price dierently in dierent situations. Our mechanism accomplishes this because
traders, including sellers, make trading decisions after they have observed some
of the decisions of other traders. This feature of our mechanism allows traders to
react in a exible way to information about the types of the other traders.
At the same time, when the number of traders gets large, traders (almost) lose
their ability to manipulate the trading price. As a result, our equilibrium has a
'rational expectations' property. Specically, the trading decision for each trader
2Gresik (1991) has shown that it is impossible to achieve ex-post eciency using static mech-
anisms in the interdependent value environment with valuation functions linear in traders' types
and independent type distributions.
3is the best outcome that is feasible given the equilibrium trading price, and given
all the information that is revealed along the equilibrium path associated with
the trading process. Traders appear to be making optimal choices in all situations
conditional on information revealed by the nal equilibrium trading price and their
own equilibrium outcome.
It is worth noting that models where traders observe the actions of other traders
often provide negative results regarding convergence of equilibrium. The best
example might be Wolinsky (1988) where traders are given repeated opportunities
to observe others' behavior. Wolinsky shows that this will prevent trade from
occurring at the right price even when there are many traders with almost costless
opportunities to interact.
A similar result in a dierent setting is provided by Horner and Jamison (2004)
who analyze an innitely repeated sequence of auctions in which bidders have
private (but unchanging) information about the common value of a good being
sold. Bidders are repeatedly given the opportunity to observe the bids being
made by others, and could potentially use this information to learn the common
value. They give examples of equilibria in which no private information is ever
revealed. Gottardi and Serrano (2002) analyze a series of models somewhat similar
in structure to the one analyzed in Wolinsky (1988) and show that aggregation
failures are closely related to the traders' market power. Gottardi and Serrano
(2002) point out that traders know their actions are being observed, and this
provides them with an additional opportunity to manipulate the outcome of the
mechanism in their favor. Their behavior becomes less informative as a result.
The ability to directly manipulate others' beliefs is a key reason for the failure of
convergence discovered by Wolinsky (1988) and the other authors cited above. One
of the advantages of our mechanism is that the impact of such behavior becomes
small in a large market.
Our paper also contributes to the design of ascending-price auctions and un-
derstanding of their incentive properties. One-sided ascending-price (English) auc-
tions have been studied by Krishna (2003), Izmalkov (2003), Birulin and Izmalkov
(2003) and others. Ausubel (2004) constructs an ascending-bid auction for multi-
ple items. In a context considerably dierent from ours, Ausubel points out that
an ascending-bid auction may retain eciency with interdependent values, while
static one-shot auctions typically suer from winner's curse. This result relates his
paper to ours, to the extent that they both point at the advantages of dynamic
ascending-price auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we show why double
auctions cannot achieve eciency without aliation. In section 3 we present our
model. Section 4 contains our main result. In section 5 we discuss the implications.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
42 Double Auctions
First, let us consider why double auctions are restrictive. Suppose that traders'
bids and asks are all monotonically related to their `types'. Then any ask price
announced by a seller is equivalent to a contingent plan according to which this
seller agrees to trade if the value of the appropriate order statistic -the m-th lowest
value among m bids and n asks- is above this seller's ask price. Suppose that for
some array of types, this order statistic is equal to p and it is ex-post ecient
for our seller to trade. By the rules of the double auction, the seller will end up
trading under any array of other trader types which gives rise to a higher value of
this order statistic. So if the double auction supports an ecient outcome, it must
be ecient for this seller to trade when this order statistic has any value higher
than p. An increase in the value of this order statistic will increase the price at
which the seller trades, which certainly makes the seller more willing to trade.
However, a higher value of this order statistic also signals that other traders have
higher private types. Under standard interdependence assumptions this will mean
that the seller will also assign a higher value to the good, so her opportunity cost
of trade will be higher. Some condition needs to hold to ensure that the former
eect outweighs the latter.
The condition that does this in Perry and Reny (2002) is aliation. In their
formulation, a trader's value for the good depends on her own type and on some
common quality q. Quality q is unknown and random, and the traders' types
are distributed identically and independently conditional on q. Let Fq denote the
probability distribution from which each trader's type is drawn conditional on q.
When the number of traders is very large (innite), the equilibrium price in the
double auction coincides with the full information market clearing price, and the
latter reveals the actual quality.
Now x a quality q, and let pq be the corresponding full information price.
Consider a buyer whose type xq is such that he bids pq in the double auction.
Since the double auction price is equal to the full information market clearing
price, the outcome should be ex post ecient. So the buyer of type xq must be
just indierent between trading and not trading at price pq, and the measure of
the set of traders whose types are higher than xq (who get the good in an ex-post
ecient outcome) must be exactly equal to the measure of the set of available
goods.
Next, consider a lower `quality' q0, i.e. q0 < q. The full information price pq0
corresponding to quality q0 and hence the equilibrium price in the double auction
must be lower than pq. But the buyer of type xq bids pq irrespective of the actual
quality, which she is uncertain of. So he will win a unit of output at the new price
pq0.
Hence, to maintain ex post eciency, the reduction in price from pq to pq0 in the
double auction has to at least compensate the buyer of type xq for the reduction in
5the quality of the good from q to q0. This is ensured by the aliation assumption,
because it implies that pq0 cannot exceed the price p at which the buyer of type xq
is indierent between trading and not trading the good of quality q0. To understand
why this is so, note that under aliation the distribution of types conditional on
q rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of types conditional on q0.
Therefore, the measure of the set of traders whose types are above xq is at least
as large when quality is q as it is when quality is q0. So when the quality is q0,
the equilibrium price in the double auction must fall below p to ensure that some
buyers with valuations below xq bid above this equilibrium price and end up with
the good. Otherwise, the market would not clear, as the set of buyers who want
to purchase good at the nal price would be smaller than the set of sellers who
would like to sell at that price.
Generally speaking, a double auction works well if an increase in quality causes
the mth-lowest order statistic of traders' types to rise faster than traders' full
information values. What follows is a nite example that shows how things can
go wrong. This example will also be used below to illustrate how the ascending
auction procedure eliminates this problem.
There are 6 traders. Only one of them is a seller, so this is a simple auction
environment except for the fact that the seller is strategic and privately informed.
Types are commonly known to be integers between 3 and 10. The ex post value
function of trader i is given by






where W [x] denotes the `whole part' function, i.e. the largest integer that is less
than or equal to x.
The lowest value that a trader can have in this environment is 6 (when all
traders have type 3), and the highest value is 20 which occurs when all traders
have type 10. Of particular interest are two states of the world corresponding to




In each of these two states, it is the seller who has type 9. The proles of traders'





In state 1 all the buyers have high types, which raises the seller's value because
of interdependence. In state 2, only the seller and the rst two buyers have high
types, while the other buyers have rather low types. The full information price
can be anything between 16 and 17 in state 1, but must be equal to 15 in state 2.
Importantly, for the outcome of the auction mechanism to be ecient, the seller
of type 9 would need to sell in state 2, but keep the good in state 1. That is, she
needs to sell the good if price does not rise above 15, and to keep it if a higher
price of 16 is reached. Thus, this example has the plausible but unusual (at least in
auction theory) property that the seller's 'supply' of the good has to be inversely
related to price.
Now suppose that the joint distribution of types is such that any trader of type
8 believes that with a very high probability the true state is a permutation of state
1 i.e., 4 of 5 other traders have type 8 while one trader has type 9. Similarly,
traders with types 3 or 10 believe that, with a very high probability, the true state
is a permutation of state 2. Finally, any trader of type 9 believes that with very
high probability, the true state is either a permutation of state 1 or a permutation
of state 2, and that each of the two congurations is equally likely. Types are
distinctly not aliated in this example. A trader whose type rises from 3 to 8
believes that with a very high probability the types of some of the other traders
will rise, while some of them will fall.
The double auction cannot support an ecient outcome in both states 1 and
2. A trader of type 8 believes that her/his value is very close to 16, and is almost
sure that there is another bidder who has this same value and belief. Therefore, in
any equilibrium, a trader of type 8 must bid close to 16 with a high probability. A
trader of type 10 is in a similar position. He believes that his value is very close to
15 and is almost sure that there is another trader with the same value and beliefs.
As a consequence, such trader's bid must be very close to 15 with high probability.
This argument implies that traders' bids will not be monotonically increasing in
their types as would be necessary for ex post eciency.
In particular, the seller will submit the same bid in both states. He could
submit a bid above 16 and keep the good in both states. Alternatively, he could
bid below 15 and sell in both states. Each of these two strategies would produce
ex post ineciency in one of the two states. Finally, if the seller submits a bid
between 15 and 16 he will sell in the wrong state.
The failure of double auction in this example stems from the fact that a seller
has to make a bid and a trading decision completely independently of the realized




There are n sellers and m buyers trading in a market. Let N [ M denote the set
of traders (both buyers and sellers). Each seller has one unit of a homogeneous
good, while each buyer has an inelastic demand for one unit of this good.
A trader's type lies in a compact subset 
  R. Below we will restrict the set of
feasible types to be nite. Trader i's valuation for the good is given by u(xi;x i)
where xi is trader i's privately known type, and x i is the prole of types of all
other traders. The value function u(xi;x i) is assumed to be continuous in xi and
non-decreasing in each of its arguments. Note that all traders have the same value
function, with the rst argument of the function denoting the type of the trader
her/himself, and the second argument standing for the prole of the other traders'
types. The value function in Perry and Reny (2002) is a special case of this. They
assume that the full information value of trader i is given by v(xi;q) where xi is
the trader's own type, and q is the unobservable quality of the good being traded.
This can be supported as a special case of our formulation by setting
u(xi;x i) = Exi;x iv(xi;q)
as long as v is increasing in both its arguments, and xi and q are aliated.3
A buyer's payos is equal to her expected value less the price that she pays for
the good. A buyer gets zero payo if she does not buy and pays nothing. A seller's
payo is equal to the price that she receives less her expected value. A seller gets
zero payo if she does not sell and receives nothing.
Assumption 1 (Single Crossing Condition) If xi > xj (where xj is the jth com-
ponent of x i), then u(xi;xj;x i j)  u(xj;xi;x i j).
This assumption requires that, starting from any prole of types in which two
traders have the same types, an increase in the type of one of these traders has
more impact on this trader's value than the same increase in the other trader's
type.4 In Perry and Reny (2002) this restriction holds because an increase in xi
improves i's perception of the quality of the good q just as much as an increase in
xj does, but an increase in xi also improves i's valuation of every quality.
Assumption 1 along with the assumption that all traders have the same value
function implies that the trader with the highest type also has the highest value.
The value function is also assumed to possess the following continuity property:
3Here, the expectation is taken using posterior beliefs about q conditional on the types of
all traders. Aliation between xj, for all j, and q is needed to ensure that the expectation is
increasing in the type of every trader.
4We do not need to strengthen the single-crossing conditions along the lines of Krishna (2003)
or Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) because bidders are symmetric here.









for every pair xj;x0
j 2 X, for every xi 2 X and x ij 2 X n+m 2.
This assumption ensures that when the number of traders is very large, the in-
uence of any single trader's type on any other trader's valuation becomes small.
However, it does not imply that the aggregate inuence of the prole of the other
trader's types on a trader's valuation becomes small.
The traders' types are drawn from the joint probability distribution Fmn which
is common knowledge. We assume that Fmn is symmetric5 and that the marginal
distributions of traders' types are identical and have a nite support X  
 which
is independent of m and n. For x 2 X, let x+ denote the next higher type in X.
We make the following full support assumption:
Assumption 3 There exists an " > 0 such that for any xi 2 X and any m and
n, PrFmn f~ xi = xijx ig  " for all x i.
This condition is borrowed from Peters and Severinov (2005) and resembles a con-
dition in Cripps and Swinkels (2006). Among other things, it ensures that all the
conditional expectations that are used in the sequel are well dened. Conditional
independence with a common and full support (as in Perry and Reny (2002)) is
consistent with this assumption. Note that we do not impose any of the aliation
assumptions used by Perry and Reny (2002).
3.2 Ascending-Price Double Auction Mechanism.
Below we provide the description of our ascending-price double auction mechanism.
In the course of this auction, all traders (sellers included) bid for the right to own




u(x;x i)jx i(1) = x; ;x i(m) = x
i
(2)
where x is the lowest type in the support X. Here, and in the rest of the paper, the
notation y(k) refers to the kth lowest element in the type vector y. Similarly, y i(k)
refers to the kth lowest element in the vector y i which is obtained from vector y
by excluding the type of the i-th trader.
5This symmetry assumption, like the assumption that all traders have the same valuation
function, is used to construct an equilibrium in which all traders use the same bidding rule. The
analytical complexities associated with asymmetric bidding rules in the interdependent value
environment are daunting, so we do not know whether our results can be extended to asym-
metric traders with dierent prior beliefs. Peters and Severinov (2005) show that in the private
value case, an equilibrium exists in which buyers use a common bidding rule similar to the one
constructed in this paper, even without common priors.
9All traders simultaneously declare whether they want to remain active at price
q, or whether they want to drop out of the bidding at this price and become
inactive. If the number of active bidders exceeds the number of units for sale, the
auctioneer raises the price according to a formula that will be described below, and
this process is repeated. The price increases until the number of active bidders
is less than or equal to the number of units of the good for sale.6 All trades are
executed at the price attained at this terminal point. Active buyers are given a
unit of the good at this trading price. Inactive sellers are given the trading price for
the unit that they have for sale. Active sellers leave the market without trading.
If the number of active traders is below the number of units for sale, the unsold
units are randomly awarded to the bidders who dropped out of the bidding at the
nal trading price.
The history of the game at each price p consists of a list of traders who have
dropped out of the bidding, and the prices at which they have dropped out. It
will be convenient to summarize this history by assigning types to the traders who
have already dropped out. This assignment of types is also necessary to describe
the price adjustment rule. Suppose that after some history (including the null
history) h, the current price is p and k  0 bidders have dropped out and have
been assigned types ^ xh  f^ x1;:::; ^ xkg ordered from the lowest to the highest. Any
bidder who drops out at the current price p is assigned type ^ xp where ^ xp is the
solution for x in the following equation:
E
h
u(x; ~ x i)j~ x i(1) = ^ x1;:::; ~ x i(k) = ^ xk; ~ x i(k+1) =  = ~ x i(m) = x
i
= p (3)
The solution ^ xp to this equation exist by induction given the price adjustment rule
described below. Also, by the monotonicity of the utility function, ^ xp > ^ xj for all
j = 1;:::;k.
Suppose that l bidders drop out and become inactive at price p. Each of these
(now inactive) bidders is assigned type ^ xp and an order number between k+1 and
k0 = k + l (the ordering is arbitrary). Thus, ^ xi = ^ xp for i = k + 1;:::;k0.
If there are still more active bidders than there are goods for sale, the price is





^ xp+; ~ x i

j~ x i(1) = ^ x1;:::; ~ x i(k0) = ^ xk0; ~ x i(k0+1) =  = ~ x i(m) = ^ xp+
i
= p+ (4)
Recall that ^ xp+ stands for the next element on the grid X which is higher than
^ xp. If some bidders drop out at p+, then the auction ends in case the number of
6The mechanism could be modied to allow inactive traders to re-enter the bidding as in
Izmalkov (2003). Since the equilibrium that we construct achieves an ecient outcome without
reentry and, moreover, reentry would never be optimal for a trader i even if it was allowed -
provided that other traders use the equilibrium strategies, we assume re-entry away to simplify
the presentation.
10goods exceeds the number of remaining active bidders. Otherwise, the described
price adjustment procedure is performed again. If no bidders drop out at p+, then
the price is raised to the next level p++ which is given by the same expression as
in (4) except that (^ xp+) is replaced by the next element on the grid (^ xp+)
+.
We summarize the history of the game via a tuple h  f^ x1;:::; ^ xk;pg where
each element in the tuple (except the price p) corresponds to the type assigned
to some trader who has dropped out on the path of the game. These types are
calculated by iteratively applying (3). Finally, let H be the set of all such tuples
with k  m. A strategy for each bidder is a map from H into the set of proba-
bility distributions over the set fa;ig (where a stands for active, and i stands for
inactive). These descriptions of the price adjustment procedure and the strategy
sets complete the denition of a sequential game of incomplete information.
Denition 1 A -perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs
such that no trader can increase his or her payo by more than  by deviating
from her equilibrium strategy given her beliefs, and such that beliefs satisfy Bayes
rule on the equilibrium path.
4 A Strategy Rule for the Ascending-Price Dou-
ble Auction
We will assume that after any history h all traders (except the trader whose type
is the subject of beliefs) believe that with probability 1, an inactive trader with
order number i has the type ^ xi which was assigned by the price adjustment rule.
Also, all traders believe that each active trader (except the trader whose type is
the subject of beliefs) has type at least as high as ^ xp given by the solution to
(3). We are now ready to describe equilibrium strategy rule for the traders in this
auction mechanism. For every history h, a strategy rule species whether or not
an active trader should continue bidding. To describe the strategy rule we start
with the following denition:
Denition 2 Active trader i's willingness to pay after history h is equal to:
E
h




where h = f^ x1;:::; ^ xk;pg for some k and ^ xp is the solution to (3).
Conditioning on h in this expectation means conditioning on the event ~ x i(1) =
^ x1;:::; ~ x i(k) = ^ xk.
An active trader's willingness to pay is her expected value conditional on the
event that just enough traders drop out at the current price p so that the auction
11ends. Note that, by the full support assumption, the expectations in this denition
are always well-dened.
Denition 3 The strategy  is dened as follows: each bidder remains active
(continues bidding) if his willingness to pay is strictly higher than the current
price, and becomes inactive otherwise.
Observe that, according to , any bidder whose type is strictly higher than ^ xp will
continue bidding at price p. It remains to characterize the outcome of the auction
when traders use the strategy . This outcome depends on the types of all the
traders.
Denition 4 Consider some array of types x = fx1;:::;xng and suppose that
trader i has the rth lowest type in this array. Let trader i's perceived value vi[x]
under the array x be equal to
E
n
u(xi; ~ x i)j~ x i(1) = x1;:::; ~ x i(r 1) = xr 1; ~ x i(r) =  = ~ x i(m) = xi
o




u(xi; ~ x i)j~ x i(1) = x1;:::; ~ x i(r 1) = xr 1
o
if r > m (7)
Also, let v(m)[x] (or simply v(m) when the array of types is clear from the context)
be the perceived value of the trader with the mth lowest type in x.
Trader i's perceived value is roughly his expected valuation of the good, conditional
either on the knowledge of m lowest types in the array x, or on the knowledge of
the types lower than his and the estimate that the m-th lowest type in the array
x does not exceed her type xi. By construction, v(m) is the mth-lowest such value.
Our main theorem can now be stated.
Theorem 1 Let  > 0 and suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there is
some N such that there exists an -perfect Bayesian equilibrium where all traders
use the strategy rule  if the number of sellers and hence the goods being sold is
larger than N. For each array of types x that occurs with a positive probability,
all trades occur at price v(m)[x]. A trader whose type is above x(m) will win a unit
of the good for sure, a trader whose type is below x(m) will not win a unit of the
good. A trader whose type is x(m) may or may not win a unit - in either case his
expected value for the good will be the same as the equilibrium trading price.
Proof: See the appendix.
Two observations are in order at this point. First, in the proof we show that the
traders with n highest perceived values always end up with the good. By symmetry
and the single-crossing Assumption 1, these are the traders with n highest types.
12So the equilibrium outcome of the mechanism is ex post ecient with probability
1.
The second observation is that the bidding decisions of traders on the equi-
librium path completely reveal m lowest types of traders. So once the auction
ends, the expected value of the good conditional on all information revealed by
the bidding for a trader i who ends up with a unit of the good is equal to his per-
ceived value vi[x]. So the traders who consume the good have perceived values at
least as high as the trading price v(m)[x]. A trader who ends up without the good
has expected value that is at least as high as her perceived value. However, his
expected value is monotonic in his own type and therefore cannot exceed v(m)[x].
Consequently, the equilibrium outcome is the best one for every trader conditional
on the equilibrium price and the information that traders have at the end of the
bidding process. We refer to this as the rational expectations property.
However, unlike in a standard rational expectations equilibrium where traders
only condition their beliefs on price, the traders' beliefs at the end of the bidding
process are conditioned on all the information revealed in the course of bidding.
The ascending auction procedure we study here can never reveal the highest trader
types, so the equilibrium trading price will not generally be fully revealing, and in
particular the equilibrium trading price will not coincide with the full information
market clearing price.7
Yet since our rational expectations property holds uniformly for all trader types,
it holds for every trader under any array of types that generates the same equilib-
rium outcome for the trader. Thus the ascending double auction has a stronger
rational expectations property: the outcome of the mechanism will appear to be
the best one for each trader conditional on the information conveyed by her own
trading outcome (i.e., the nal trading price and whether or not she has won the
good). We show by an example below that this property may not hold if a trader
conditions her belief only on information conveyed by the nal price.
5 Discussion
In the example studied in section 2, our bidding rule  supports ex post e-
cient trade in the problematic states that we described above. Recall that in our
discussion we have focused on two type proles/states of the world:
State 1: f9;8;8;8;8;8g
State 2: f9;10;10;3;3;3g
7The equilibrium price in the double auction described in Perry and Reny (2002) does not
coincide with the full information price in this sense either. They show that the equilibrium price
in the double auction will be close to the full information price with high probability.
13with full information values equal to f17;16;16;16;16;16g
and f14;15;15;8;8;8g in states 1 and 2 respectively.
Given the utility function (1) and the assumption that the lowest trader type
is 3, we can use (2) to compute the starting (reserve) price in our mechanism - it is
equal to the lowest full information value of 6 which occurs when all traders have
type 3.
Let us, rst, focus on state 2 with the array of types f9;10;10;3;3;3g. All
bidders need to compute the type assigned to any bidder who drops out at price
6. This type is given by the solution to (3), and is equal to 3. At this price,
the seller (whose type is 9) and the buyers whose types are 10 have willingness
to pay exceeding 6. However, the three buyers with types equal to 3 would drop
out immediately according to . Successive application of the price adjustment
rule causes the price to rise to 14. At price 14, the seller (whose type is 9) would
drop out because her willingness to pay no longer exceeds the current auction
price. The two high-value buyers with types 10 will then continue to bid until the
auction price reaches 15, at which point both of them will drop out. One of them
will be chosen at random to trade. Hence, the nal trading price will be equal to
the full information market clearing price 15.
Now let us consider state 1. Again, bidding will start at price 6. At this point,
the seller's willingness to pay is 12, while the buyers' willingness to pay is 11. Each
trader's willingness to pay (which changes as the price increases) remains above the
price and all traders remain active, until the price reaches 16. At this price, each
buyer's willingness to pay is also 16. So, all buyers will drop out of the bidding at
16 and will be assigned type 8. The seller, as the only trader who remains active
at this price, wins the auction and ends up keeping the good. Again, the nal
trading price is equal to the full information market clearing price.
The seller's \odd" desire to keep the good when the price is high and trade it
when the price is low is accommodated by the fact that the seller can reserve his
decision whether or not to remain active when the price exceeds 15 until after he
observes the bidding decisions of the other traders. When he observes three buyers
drop out at price 6, he concludes that there is no point holding out for a high price
once bidding reaches 15. When all buyers continue to bid until the price reaches
15, the seller concludes that the value of the good is even higher, and bids more
aggressively to hold on to it.
The same example, but with a dierent state of the world, can be used to
illustrate why  is only an approximate equilibrium and why we need a large
number of sellers. For example, in the state
f7;7;3;3;3;3g
the trading price is 10 if traders use . When the auction price reaches 10, both
the seller and the buyer of type 7 have to decide whether to continue bidding.
14According to , both of them should drop out at price 10. If they do so, the seller
may or may not sell.
The problem is that the seller knows that he is pivotal when the price reaches
10, since at this point only he and another buyer are active. If the seller drops out
at this point, the process ends and he earns zero prot. If he continues bidding,
there are two possibilities. One is that the buyer will drop out, which will happen
if the buyer's type is 7, as in the current type prole. The seller will then win the
auction and earn zero prot. The other possibility is that the buyer will remain
in the bidding -which would happen if the buyer's type is 8 or greater. In that
case, the price will rise to at least 12 (by (4)). The seller might win the auction
at price 12 if the buyer drops out, but this does not create a problem because her
surplus is zero in that case, just as it is if he drops out at price 10. Alternatively,
if the seller drops out at price 12 before the buyer does, the seller will get a higher
price from a buyer - whose type in this case must be at least 8. So dropping out
of bidding at price 10 is suboptimal for the seller.
In this example, the expected gain to the seller from continuing to bid is sig-
nicant. However, when the number of sellers and hence the number of goods
being auctioned is large, an active seller becomes pivotal when there are exactly n
other active traders each of whom has a willingness to pay exceeding the current
price. When n is large, the full support Assumption 3 guarantees that with a high
probability at least one of the other active bidders has willingness to pay equal
to the current price. This makes it very unlikely that the seller can prolong the
auction by continuing to bid.
We can also use this example to illustrate the rational expectations property
of our mechanism. This property was described in the previous section. Consider
the outcome in state 1 where the prole of types is f9;8;8;8;8;8g. When all
the buyers drop out at price 16, the seller believes that each of the buyers has
type 8. Bidding ends and the seller fails to trade. Ex post, the fact that all the
buyers dropped out simultaneously at price 16 reveals the true state to the seller.
Conditional on this belief about the state, the seller's demand correspondence at
price 16 consists of only one outcome, not trading, which is what happens in the
auction. So the outcome is in the seller's `demand' correspondence conditional on
all the information the outcome reveals. In state 2 where the prole of types is
f9;10;10;3;3;3g, the seller also learns the state once bidding ends. Conditional
on this information he would prefer to trade at price 15. Once again, the outcome
is in his demand correspondence given the price and posterior beliefs.
However, it would be wrong to think that the seller can choose the best out-
come if she conditions her decision only on information revealed by price. For,
consider the states f8;7;7;7;7;7g and f8;9;9;3;3;3g which may also arise in the
example which we have considered. Recall that a trader's utility function is equal





, and so the full information values in these two states
15are f15;14;14;14;14g and f13;14;14;9;9;9g, respectively. The equilibrium trad-
ing price predicted by Theorem 1 is 14 in both states but the seller keeps the good
in the rst state and sells in the second. Our ascending-price auction mechanism
can deliver this outcome, because the seller learns a lot more about the types of
the others in the course of bidding. In contrast, the described outcome would be
infeasible in a static rational expectations equilibrium where the seller only gets
to see the price.
6 Conclusions
We have provided an ascending-price double auction mechanism and a strategy rule
which constitutes an -perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this mechanism when the
number of sellers is large enough. To the best of our knowledge, dynamic double
auctions have not yet been studied in the literature. The allocation supported
by this equilibrium in our mechanism is ex post ecient. This property holds
even when the types of the traders are not aliated, so our mechanism delivers
an ecient outcome in cases where a standard double auction would not. This is
so because in our mechanism traders acquire information about the types of the
other traders in the course of the bidding.
The equilibrium we describe is only an approximate equilibrium. It is di-
cult to say whether there is a way around this problem. The same property of
the ascending-price mechanism that supports the revelation of information in the
course of bidding also allows sellers to realize whether they are pivotal and attempt
to manipulate the price. When the market is large, there is little for sellers to gain
from this information, so their incentive to deviate becomes arbitrarily small.
Appendix - Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem, we rst specify the traders' beliefs. We then show that
 induces traders to behave as if they had private values equal to their perceived
values dened by (6) or (7). This allows us to show that buyers cannot gain by
deviating from . Sellers, on the other hand, can increase their payo by deviating
from  in some information sets. In the nal section, we show that the extra gains
that the sellers get by deviating in these special information sets become arbitrarily
small as the number of traders get large, provided that Assumption 3 holds.
6.1 Beliefs
The traders' beliefs in the ascending-price double auction are determined by the
prior type distribution and observations of the dropout decisions of the other
16traders. Specically, the beliefs are constructed recursively using the procedure
described in section 2.
Condition 1 Consider some history h = f^ x1;:::; ^ xk;pg. Then the type of a bid-
der who drops out after history h is believed to be ^ xp with probability 1, where ^ xp is
dened by (3). If a bidder remains active after history h, then her type is believed
to be at least as large as ^ xp.
Lemma 1 If all traders use strategy , then beliefs constructed according to Con-
dition 1 satisfy Bayes rule after any history that occurs with a positive probability
on the equilibrium path of the auction.
Proof: Follows immediately from the denition of . Q:E:D:
We will say that i believes that the array of types x i is possible after history
h if the beliefs given by Condition 1 put a positive probability on x i.
6.2 Buyers Act as if they have Private Values
The following lemma provides a result that is central to the logic of the proof of
the theorem. Fix an array of types fx1;:::;xm+ng and calculate the corresponding
array of perceived values fv1;:::;vm+ng dened by (6) or (7). Then trader i with
type xi who uses  and believes that other traders follow  will act just as if
he had private value equal to vi. If trader i deviates from , then she acts in
the same way as a trader with some type x0
i following . So, trader i can gure
out the impact of his deviation by calculating the new array of perceived values
associated with fx1;:::;x0
i;:::;xmg then applying  to obtain the new outcome.
Lemma 2 Let h0 be a bidding history. Suppose that all traders' beliefs satisfy
1 and that all traders other than i follow strategy  in the auction mechanism
after history h0. Let h1 be a successor to h0 that i believes occurs with a positive
probability given i's strategy, and let x i be an array of types of traders other
than i that i believes is possible conditional on the history h1. Then there is x0
i
such that each active trader j's (j 6= i) willingness to pay in h1 is larger than the
price p associated with h1 if and only if trader j's perceived value under array of
types (x0
i;x i) is larger than p. If i is active in h1, then x0
i = x i(m). Otherwise,
x0
i  x i(m).
Proof: \Only if"Part: If active trader j's willingness to pay after history
h1 is larger than p, then trader j's perceived value under the array of
types (x0
i;x i) is larger than p.
Let h1 = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr;pg. If i is active at h1 and the auction has not yet ended
at this point, then the belief that i's type is at least as large as x i(m) is consistent
17with 1, so let us take x0
i = x i(m). If i is inactive at h1, let x0
i be the type i was
assigned by (3) when he became inactive.
Consider some trader j who is active after history h1. Then j's willingness to
pay at this point is given by:
E
h




where ^ xp is dened by the solution to (3). Suppose that trader j's willingness to
pay is larger than p. Since by denition of ^ xp,
E
h
u(^ xp; ~ x j)jh1; ~ x j(r+1) =  = ~ x j(m) = ^ xp
i
= p , and the utility function is
monotonically increasing in trader's type, we have xj > ^ xp.
Suppose that j's type xj is such that xj = (x0
i;x i)(t) . Let t0 = minft;mg and
let x0
j = min[xj;(x0
i;x i)(m)]. Then by Denition 4, j's perceived value is equal to
E
h
u(xj; ~ x j)j~ x j(1) = (x0
i;x i)(1);:::; ~ x j(t0 1) = (x0




Since x i is an array of types of traders other than i that i believes is possible
conditional on the history h1, and i acts as if her type is x0
i and she follows ,
and j is active after history h1, we have r < t0 and ^ x = ((x0
i;x i)(1);:::;(x0
i;x i)(r)).
Therefore, j's perceived value in (9) is at least as large as the following:
E
h
u(xj; ~ x j)j~ x j(1) = (x
0
i;x i)(1);:::; ~ x j(r) = (x
0





u(xj; ~ x j)jh1; ~ x j(r+1) =  = ~ x j(m) = ^ x
p
i
The last expression is trader j's willingness to pay.
\If" Part: If active trader j's willingness to pay in h1 is less than or
equal to p, then j's perceived value under the array of types (x0
i;x i) is
also less than or equal to p.
Formally, the fact that j's willingness to pay in h1 = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr;pg does not
exceed p can be written as
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h












By monotonicity of the value function in own type, xj  ^ xp. Since all bidders












u(xj; ~ x j)j~ x j(1) = min[xj;(x
0




Since xj  ^ xp, the last expression is equal to j's perceived value, so j's perceived
value is less than or equal to p. Q:E:D:
6.3 The outcome associated with 
Let h = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr;pg be a history and x i be a set of types that i thinks is
possible in h. Let h0 = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr0;p0g be a successor to h that will be realized
when the traders other than i have a prole of types x i and follow strategy 
while i follows some strategy. By Lemma 2, when the prole of other trader types
is x i, there is a type x0
i such that bidder i can predict whether trader j will
choose to continue bidding by calculating j's perceived value under (xj;x0
i;x i j)
and comparing it to p0, for all j 6= i. This provides a simple necessary and sucient
condition for bidding to end at price p0 when traders other than i are using  -
the number of traders whose perceived values exceed p should not be higher than
n.
Let ^ v[x0
i;x i] (or just ^ v when the implied array of types is clear from the context)
be the vector of perceived values associated with types (x0
i;x i).
Lemma 3 Let h be a history and x i a prole of types that trader i believes is
possible after history h. Suppose that all traders other than i use strategy 
in the continuation following h. Suppose the bidding ends after some history
h0 = f^ x1;:::; ^ xm;qg and that i wins a unit of output. Then q cannot exceed
^ v(m)[x i(m);x i].
Proof: Write ^ v(m) = ^ v(m)[x i(m);x i]. Suppose q > ^ v(m). Since all traders other
than i use strategy  there must be some predecessor history h00 = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr;q00g









Since r < m, at least n + 1 trader types in the array of types (x0
i;x i) are at
least ^ xq. Each of these traders has a willingness to pay of at least q which strictly
exceeds ^ v(m). Then by Lemma 2 each of these traders has a perceived value that
strictly exceeds ^ v(m). But by denition, ^ v(m) is the mth lowest perceived value, so
at most n perceived values can be equal to or higher than ^ v(m), a contradiction.
Q:E:D:
19Lemma 4 Suppose that all traders other than i use strategy  in the continuation
after history h, the type prole of traders other than i is given by x i and buyer
i thinks that prole x i is possible after history h. Also, suppose that buyer i is
awarded a unit of the good at price q when the auction ends. Let x0
i = x i(m). Then
q  ^ v(m)[x0
i;x i].
Proof: Suppose that the trading price at the end of the auction is equal to p <
^ v(m)[x0
i;x i]. By Lemma 2, traders with perceived values ^ v(m)[x0
i;x i] and higher
will all remain active at price p since they are using strategy . There are at least
n such traders other than i. So the auction can end at p only if buyer i drops out,
but in this case i will not win the good. Q:E:D:
We summarize the results obtained so far in the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the type prole of traders other than i is given by x i.
Also, suppose that after history h trader i believes that the type prole x i is
possible, and all traders other than i follow the strategy  in the continuation.
Then
1. If trader i drops out of the bidding so that all traders believe that i's type is
x0
i, then all trades will occur at price ^ v(m)[x0
i;x i].
2. Suppose that i is a buyer who is active at h and, like all other traders, follows
 in the continuation. Let v be the array of perceived values corresponding to
the type prole (xi;x i). Then buyer i will win a unit of the good at price v(m)
if his perceived value exceeds v(m); i will not win a unit if his perceived value
is less than v(m). Equivalently, i will trade if his type exceeds (xi;x i)(m),
and will not trade if his type is less than (xi;x i)(m).
To complete the proof, we establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, and the number of sellers n is large
enough, the strategy rule  for all players, and belief system constructed according
to Condition 1 constitute a -perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ascending double
auction.
Proof: Buyer's Part. Let us establish that a buyer cannot gain by deviating
from . Let x i be an array of types that buyer i thinks is possible after some
history. By Lemmas 3 and 4, buyer i will trade at price v(m)[xi;x i] under this
array of types if all traders follow  in the continuation and xi > x i(m). By
Lemma 4, i cannot lower this trading price by deviating from  unless he fails to
trade.
So it only remains to show that buyer i cannot get a higher payo by deviating
from  in his decision to drop out of the bidding. Suppose that xi < x i(m). Then
20by Corollary 1, if buyer i follows , then he will not trade and hence obtain zero
payo. If he deviates from  and ends up trading, then by Lemmas 3 and 4, he
will pay the price of at least v(m)[x i(m);x i]. But v(m)[x i(m);x i]  v(m)[xi;x i] >
vi[xi;x i]. By Lemma 2, i's willingness to pay is also below the trading price, so
such deviation will not be protable.
Similarly, if xi > x i(m) (i.e. vi[xi;x i] > v(m)[xi;x i]), then i will trade at price
v(m)[xi;x i] and receive a strictly positive surplus, which is better than what he
could get by dropping out before the auction ends. So following  is a best reply
for buyers if all other traders are using .
It remains to consider the case xi = x i(m). By Corollary 1, in this case i may
or may not win an auction if he follows . If he does win, he will pay the price
v(m)[xi;x i] which is equal to both his perceived value and his willingness to pay.
By Lemma 4, there is no strategy for i which allows him to trade at a price below
v(m)[xi;x i], so any i's deviation from  is unprotable. This completes the proof
for the buyers.
Seller's Part. A dierent approach is needed for sellers, because a seller can
get a positive payos only if he is inactive at the end of the auction and trades.
Fix a history h, a seller i, and an array of types x i that the seller thinks is
possible conditional on h. Suppose xi > x i(m) (i.e. vi[xi;x i] > v(m)[xi;x i]). If
seller i follows strategy  along with all other traders, then the auction will end
at price equal to v(m)[xi;x i] and seller i will not trade and receive zero payo. If
seller i deviates to some alternative strategy and sells as a result of this deviation,
then from part 1 of Corollary 1, there is x0
i such that x0
i < x i(m) < xi and the nal
price in the auction would be v(m)[x0





i < xi, this is less than
v(m)[xi;x i]   u(xi;x i):
The same relationship holds for any array to types x0
 i which has the same lowest










u(xi; ~ x i)j~ x i(1) = x i(1);:::; ~ x i(m) = x i(m)
o
The last expression is less than zero because xi > x i(m). So such deviation is
unprotable.
On the other hand, if xi  x i(m) for some array of types x i that i thinks is
possible when auction price reaches some level p, then i could try to raise his payo
by remaining in the bidding after the auction price reaches the level at which she
21should drop according to . The downside is that he may lose a protable trade
when he does this.
Let h = f^ x1;:::; ^ xr;pg be a history in which trader i's willingness to pay is less



































The rst term is non-positive and reects the cost to seller i of losing a trade
that he would have made had he not deviated. The second term reects the seller's
gain when he is pivotal and raises the trading price by deviating. The third term
represents the impact that seller i has on the price by making others think that his
type is higher and thereby inducing them to bid more aggressively, even though
seller i is non-pivotal. We will show that the last two terms become arbitrarily
small (and in particular smaller than ) when n becomes large.





























x i(m 1);xi;(x i n x i(m 1))j(xi;x i)(1);:::;(xi;x i)(m);x i(m 1)  xi
o
(11)
By Assumption 2, the dierence between the utility values under expectation
sign in (11) is arbitrarily small uniformly in x i if n is large enough. So, the
expectation of the dierence is also arbitrarily small when n is large.
The utility dierence in the second term remains bounded from above and

















Prfxj > ^ x
p0
for every bidder j active at p
0g
By assumption 3, Pr

xj  ^ xp0j8x j
	
 " for every bidder j active at p0 and for
every p0 > p, so Prfxj > ^ xp0
for every bidder j active at p0g  (1   ")
n. The
probability that the bidder is pivotal is then arbitrarily small at every auction
price level, provided that the number of sellers n is large enough.
Since the rst term in (10) is negative, we conclude that a seller's gain from
deviating at any price level becomes smaller than  when n is suciently large.
Q:E:D:
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